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Abstract
The internal processes by which we remember and learn (mnēmē) are in tension with
the exterior mnemonic devices of writing, photography, and archives (hypomnēsis). Attempts
to accurately record and document our lives often disrupt the living, intersubjective memory
it is meant to aid. This dichotomy plays out in both the interpersonal sphere of relationships
and identity, and in the socio-political sphere of history, governance, and economics. Our
contemporary postmodern condition, as shaped by technologic developments, is marked by an
increased skepticism about testimony, witness, and experience and a greater reliance on datadriven information and the structure of the database. Increasingly, in both the personal and
political spheres, it is the hypomnēsis paradigm of the archive that shapes our understanding of
reality and truth. In short, the database threatens to replace narrative structures as the primary
mode of representation, meaning making, and remembering.

It is this tension that my work explores as I attempt to understand myself and the world
around me through my own limited perspective. I am interested in the psychological impulse
to both document and narrativize one’s life and the inherent shortcomings of these conflicting
approaches. By investigating the conventions and aesthetics of digital and physical archives and
by drawing parallels between the personal and socio-political, my work resists essentializing
forms of knowledge production that both narratives and archives can produce. Simultaneously
through these very shortcomings my work explores the possibility for dialogic and relational
ways of knowing.
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The Poison and the Cure
When I was eight years old, my maternal grandfather gave me a copy of a genealogical
book he had written about our shared ancestors. On one of the pages there was a picture of my
parents and my older sister and underneath a caption with each of their names. I was born too late
to be included, but it was important to my grandfather that I knew where I came from, that I had
a grasp of history. The book provides an incredible amount of information about my ancestors
including where they lived, what jobs they had, their education, what boats they immigrated
on, and of course where and when they were born and died. But what is missing from such a
collection is any reflection on what motivated my ancestors to do the things they did—what were
their regrets, hopes, desires, fears? The book is chronological, but not narrative, a story doesn’t
unfold; there is no interpretation of the hard data. On the evening of November 25th, 2017, I sat
with family and watched my grandfather take his last breath. There are so many things I wish I
had asked him about his life, things now lost to death. I want to know the story of his internal life
and thoughts. What did he feel when my mother was born, or when he stood on Omaha Beach?
The pictures, letters, and documents that remain seem inadequate to answer those lingering
questions.

Inspired in part by my grandfather’s research, I began gathering and scanning my family’s
saved documents, photos, and videos. I was driven by a desire to make sense of myself and to
trace the experiences and relationships that shaped me. I wanted to understand the trajectory of
my life as it stretched back before my own birth, so that I might in turn imagine my future. I also
felt a responsibility to preserve and collect that which was once so precious to the ones I love. The
very fact that these photographs existed seemed to demand that they be attended to and preserved.
Yet in the process of gathering, scanning, and labeling, the longing for understanding and
connection remained somehow unfulfilled. The photographs offered only bits of data, glimpses,
and fragments. They were a window, but also a wall. They perpetuated a nostalgic longing while
resisting any closure of comprehension. Even pictures of myself as a child seemed now strange
and inaccessible. What did I think and feel as that photo was shot?

9
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Our capacity to know ourselves and to orient ourselves in time and space depends on our
capacity to remember. Memory allows us to construct and maintain a continual sense of self over
time and as such is integral to the ongoing process of self-realization. Our fear of death and our
fear of forgetting are intertwined. Memory is a bastion against oblivion. Yet our capacity to recall
is fallible and prone to shift and change. Out of this fear of amnesia is borne our desire for ever
more perfect ways to record and document our lives. In many ways this instinct to preserve is
tied in with our need to survive. Photographs, journals, and collected memorabilia help fulfill our
desire to understand and to live on.

In his essay “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Jacques Derrida examines Plato’s Phaedrus to
consider the opposition between the internal living, knowing memory of mnēmē and the
external recollection of hypomnēsis. Derrida writes about this as a tension between “inside”
and “outside.” He argues that the outside begins “at the point where the mnēmē, instead of
being present to itself as a movement of truth, is supplanted by the archive, evicted by a sign
of re-memoration or of com-memoration. The space of writing, space as writing, is opened up
in the violent movement of this surrogation, in the difference between mnēmē and hypomnēsis.
The outside is already within the work of memory.”1 Derrida argues then that writing is a
pharmakon—both a “cure” and “poison” for memory. Language and writing, as a mode of
translating internal thought into external signs, holds the promise of fixing and preserving our
memories. Yet that very process threatens to supplant our lived experiences. The need for such
mnemonic devices stems from the finitude and fallibility of memory. There is no limitless
memory and so “[m]emory always therefore already needs signs in order to recall the nonpresent,
with which it is necessarily in relation... Memory is thus contaminated by its first substitute:
hypomnēsis.”2

1
Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1981), 109
2
Derrida, 109
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Then as again (2020), 36” x 36” oil on canvas
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It is not only writing, but any process of externalization—photography, video, memorials,
list, inventories, archives, genealogies, etc. that function as a pharmakon. In her autobiography
Hold Still, Sally Mann addresses the poison of photography when she writes “[i]t isn’t death that
stole my father from me; it’s the photographs.”3 The effect of such external signs can lead us to
question our own recollections, to give deference to the unchanging object over and above our
flexible, subjective memories.

found photographs
3

Sally Mann, Hold Still: A Memoir with Photographs (Boston: Little Brown, 2015), 302.
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To Fix an Image
Going through the documentation of my own childhood led to a more careful
consideration of my role as a father and how I am now documenting the life of my child. In an
ongoing project titled Every Photo (2020- ), I gather every photograph ever taken of my son.
I then digitally overlay them, scaling, rotating, and repositioning them based on the size and
orientation of his head. As he has been photographed almost every day of his life, this archive is
already extensive. Yet there is so much too that we fail to capture. The accumulation and overlay
of these images is a poor stand-in for his life and my lived experience of raising a child. But the
fear of forgetting, and the desire to hold on to those moments of joy and happiness compel me to
try.

A parent, by necessity, acts as an archivist of their child’s life. They are constantly
deciding what to document and save—distinguishing between what is essential and what is
peripheral. It is through my reflections on the joy and trauma of my own childhood that I
understand the weight and responsibility of attempting to raise my son. These realizations
compelled me to interrogate the internal, often subconscious processes by which I now make
those discriminatory decisions on behalf of my son. What biases and presumptions am I
unintentionally replicating for him through the documentation process?

An archive is formed through a process of discrimination—built just as much on the
process of exclusion as it is on inclusion. When institutionalized, the discriminatory process of
archiving is tied up with power dynamics. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Michel Foucault
does not define the archive materially as simply a collection of cultural objects, or as the
institutional apparatus for gathering and collecting objects. Rather, Foucault defines the archive
theoretically as “the first law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of

14

Every Photo (2020- ) digital photo collage
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statements as unique events.”4 By this definition, the archive is a set of relations that determines
what will endure. It defines the very limits of our capacity for communication and thought. All
discourse takes place within those limitations.

For Foucault, the archive does not so much reproduce meaning as creates it. The
archive becomes the measure of truth against which our individual perspectives are compared.
Foucault’s theory also reveals then that specific archives are never neutral but reflect the values
of the institution and the individuals that create it. Foucault argues that archives, as they frame
our discourse, are to an extent inscrutable. He writes,
The archive of a society, a culture, or a civilization cannot be described
exhaustively...On the other hand, it is not possible for us to describe our own
archive, since it is from within these rules that we speak, since it is that which
gives to what we can say - and to itself, the object of our discourse – its modes of
appearance, its forms of existence and coexistence, its system of accumulation,
historicity, and disappearance.5
The archive presents a totalizing vision of reality, fixing the parameters of what can be known,
spoken, and remembered. This takes place in the socio-political sphere as much as it does in
the personal sphere. So, following Foucault, in the very process of documenting and selecting
representative images of my son, am I actively creating the limitations and boundaries on his
capacity for self-realization?

In many ways the logic of an archive is built upon and depends upon that of the
photograph. In her collection of essays On Photography, Susan Sontag examines the way that
photographs distort and replace our experience of reality. As Sontag writes, “reality has always
been interpreted through the reports given by images; and philosophers since Plato have tried to
loosen our dependence on images by evoking the standard of an image-free way of apprehending
the real.”6 Instead of escaping such a reliance Sontag argues that the “new age of unbelief
4
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans.
A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 129.
5
Foucault, 130
6
Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Picador, 1973), 153.
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Untitled (2019), 30”x 22”silkscreen print, graphite, watercolor, colored pencil,
and ink on paper

17
strengthened the allegiance to images. The credence that could no longer be given to realities
understood in the form of images was now being given to realities understood to be images,
illusions.”7 Ostensibly, the photograph is a factual documentation of reality. Yet Sontag argues
that, in actuality, the photograph creates a parallel image-world that is similar to, yet wholly
different from, the reality of lived experience. Photographs do not somehow perfectly recreate
an event. Instead they “[furnish] knowledge dissociated from and independent of experience.”8
In this way, “through being photographed, something becomes part of a system of information,
fitted into schemes of classification and storage.”9 As such, photography, like the archive does
not simply document reality, but creates a new one. Perhaps our family albums and social media
accounts, no less than institutional archives, determine the laws of what can be said.

In Home is a House My Grandfather Built (2020), I wanted examine the way that
images can become “systems of information.” This painting juxtaposes an illustrated guide on
housebuilding with drone images of an I.C.E. detention center in Texas. I wanted to question
the way the imagery in both instances is presented as neutral and utilitarian. The god’s eye view
of these camps presents a controlled and removed position that hides the particularities of the
injustices contained. While we are ostensibly seeing the entirety of the camp, in actuality we are
given no information about its inner workings and the lives lived there. The incomplete painting
of these identical, modular structures points to the lack of transparency that such images provide
and brings specificity to something otherwise presented as generic and anonymous.

7
8
9

Sontag, 153
Sontag, 156
Sontag, 156
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Home is a House My Grandfather Built (2020), 36” x 36,” pages from the book Illustrated
Housebuilding by Graham Blackburn, 1974 and oil on panel
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The Stories We Tell
In his essay “Between Memory and History,” Pierre Nora argues that memory and
history are in opposition and that increasingly history has replaced memory. Nora writes,
“memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a
representation of the past…memory is by nature multiple and yet specific; collective, plural, and
yet individual. History, on the other hand, belongs to everyone and to no one, whence its claim
to universal authority.”10 Nora goes on to argue, “[m]odern memory is, above all, archival...
The less memory is experienced from the inside the more it exists only through its exterior
scaffolding and outward signs — hence the obsession with the archive that marks our age.”11
Increasingly it is the paradigm of the archive that dominates the way we write history and makes
sense of ourselves in it. Through the hypomnemata of the archive we historicize the self—seeing
ourselves from the outside.

In a very similar way, Jeffery Wallen discusses a parallel tension between the narrative
and the archival in his essay “Narrative Tensions: The Archive and the Eyewitness.” Wallen
writes that “[t]he archive is a repository, a place of storage. It contains droplets of time—
observations, registrations, notations, pieces of data.”12 On the other hand, the eyewitness
narrative “is always intensely personal…it insists on the importance of individual experience
against the crushingly impersonal forces of history.”13 Wallen goes on to argue that the
eyewitness narrative “demands our time,” it “contains an imperative—you too must know,
must remember, must bear the marks of the past—even as it states the impossibility of ever

10
Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire” in Representations,
no. 26 (Spring, 1989): 8-9.
11
Nora, 13
12
Jeffery Wallen, “Narrative Tensions: The Archive and the Eyewitness” in Partial
Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas 7, no. 2 (2009): 261.
13
Wallen, 262
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truly grasping the violations that the witness has undergone.”14 These tensions between memory
and history—narrative and archive seem intertwined with the tension between mnēmē and
hypomnēsis. It is the same conflict of internal and external, personal and generic, knowing and
telling, experiencing and sharing.

In my piece Vigil (2020) I wanted to explore some of these tensions. Last summer I was
having a lot of trouble sleeping. As I was lying awake at night, I would watch the blue light of
my neighbor’s television play across the wall of my bedroom. I decided to spend time every
night recording what I could see of their television screen as it was cropped and distorted through
their window. I kept this ritual up for about a month. It was a way of trying to be present and
mark time, but it also stemmed from a desire to connect with others when we were unable to
be together. The nightly recordings, labeled according to the date they were made, became an
archive of time passing. The impulse to record became a mode of paying attention—an attempt
to differentiate the days through a distinct and intentional activity.

At the same time, I began regularly calling my grandmother to see how she was faring in
lock down. She lives alone in California and is isolated from family. I’ve never been particularly
close with her, and I realized how little I knew about her life. Every week I would call her to
talk for a few hours, and I started to record our conversations as she recounted memories of
her life. Editing the hours of television footage and the audio recording, I began making sense
of these two processes as a single project. They were different modes of a similar strategy for
remembering, recording, and marking time—one being a collection of impersonal fragments
of media entertainment, and the other an interpersonal, narrative dialogue. Played together,
the audio and visuals compete for attention even as they provide the possibility of a third
interpretation in the slippage between them.

14

Wallen, 262
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Vigil (2020), 12 min 31 sec, video, audio, found window
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stills from Vigil
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The digital interfaces that we interact with daily encourage this shift away from thinking
of the self narratively, and lead us to consider ourselves as a collection of curated and archived
instances. Jeffery Wallen writes, “our narratives of identity are not strictly our own. Who we are
is always also now produced by archival machines that register, observe, and record our passage
through the apparatuses of society.”15 Surveillance capitalism conflates selves with preferences
and choices, while state bureaucracies conflate them with markers of identity.16 Gathered
into a database, these information points are constantly being re-presented to us in targeted
advertisement and algorithmically curated content. The obscured archive becomes an inescapable
echo chamber of our previous choices. Who we are is thus conflated with these mediated,
technologically driven archives that are in tension with narratives, testimony, and dialogic
imagination.

In my installation I Think You Appear in this Video (2020) I wanted to explore the
processes by which we come to surveil ourselves—to think of ourselves not as part of an
unfolding story, but as points of data. The fixed externality of the photographic image can
become a totalizing vision of reality against which and through which we must contend.
Rewatching videos of myself at 4 years old, I was compelled to analyze and pick apart the
sequence of events—to dissect it in hopes of recapturing something of what I had felt and
experienced in that moment— the emotions of both joy and fear. For this project I carefully
reenacted myself walking up to the diving board and jumping in. I also got my father to
rerecord the audio and then, using a variety of software, I edited the original together with
the reenactments. This involved going frame by frame through each video dozens of times to
painstakingly erase, displace, overlay, and track the movements of the bodies and camera.

15
Wallen, “Narrative Tensions,” 269
16
For a thorough discussion of surveillance capitalism see Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of
Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (New
York, PublicAffairs, 2019). .

24

stills from I Think You Appear in this Video (2020), 2 min 54 sec, four channel video, audio
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Memory Apparatus
The logic of the archive and database are replicated and accentuated in machine learning
models and in artificial intelligence. At the core of AI are deep neural networks designed to mimic
the human brain. These artificial neural networks are trained using an optimization process that
requires a “loss function” to calculate the machine model’s error.17 The loss-function is a number
that represents the success or failure of an AI model given a specific predetermined task. Far from
mimicking the intricacies of the human thought, machine learning models replace the plurality
of motivations that drive people to learn, play, interact, and create with a singular abstract lossfunction. This process is inherently reductive and only functions within the paradigm of the
database and the logic of instrumental reasoning.18 This is in part why AI lacks the capacity for
lateral thinking, free association, or play.

In my piece, Seeing / Saying (2021), I wanted to understand the differences between how
machines and people learn and see. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a web service through
which users can create human intelligence tasks (HITs) for anonymous workers to complete online.
A common HIT template for image identification has proved invaluable in the development of
computer vision and AI facial recognition. Through MTurk, developers can quickly and efficiently
annotate and catalog vast databases of anonymously sourced images. In these HITs, workers are
asked to label objects they recognize in photographs as accurately as possible while refraining
from conjecture, emotional response, or contextual information. The underlying assumption is
that anyone, acting rationally and objectively, would label these images the same way. Yet these
assumptions only replicate the problems of photography and the archive mentioned above. The
resulting annotations are incredibly reductive, ignoring all contextual clues and replicating the
biases and presumptions of the workers.
17
Christophe Pere, “What are Loss Functions?” Towards Data Science, last modified June 17,
2020, https://towardsdatascience.com/what-is-loss-function-1e2605aeb904.
18
For a discussion of how machine learning models are trained using datasets see: Kate
Crawford and Trevor Paglen. “Excavating AI: The Politics of Training Sets for Machine
Learning,” September 19, 2019, https://excavating.ai
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Annotated images from the Localized Narratives dataset for training image captioning AI
https://google.github.io/localized-narratives/
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To demonstrate and question the presumptions of Mturk and machine learning as a utility
I created my own image identification HIT using photos from my own life. In this task for Seeing
/ Saying I asked workers to infer what they thought was happening and to explain any personal
and emotional responses they had to the images.

selections from Seeing / Saying (2021), text and photographs
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Watching my son learn, I am struck by how different his process is from machine
learning models. As opposed to an algorithm coded with a predetermined measure of success
or failure, his learning is responsive, open-ended, and exploratory. He is constantly learning by
mimicking our speech patterns and actions, mirroring our emotions, restaging the stories we
read to him, and experimenting with materials. There is no predetermined success or failure to
this type of play. It is responsive and lateral; he is always trying to understand the connections
between things. He comes to understand himself as he dynamically interacts with the objects and
people around him. This does not mean that play is entirely free or open-ended. It is constrained
by the materials and opportunities he is given by us as his parents. Yet there is lateral freedom in
his capacity to adaptively recontextualize and reframe his knowledge in novel situations.

My interest in learning as it is tied in with memory and self-realization lead to the project
titled Notes for a Son (2021). In the course of my family research, I discovered a letter written
by my great-great-grandfather Arthur to his son, my great-grandfather Erwin. After the death of
his wife, Arthur abandoned Erwin and his younger daughter, Martha. Martha went to live with
family in North Carolina, and Erwin ended up living with an abusive couple in Philadelphia.
This letter was written to Erwin when he was 33 years old and just a year before Arthur died. The
piece documents a month-long daily practice of my learning Arthur’s handwriting by copying
the letter—practicing each word over and over. The handwriting practice is paired with daily
reflections about my interactions with my son.

29

Notes for a Son, (2021), ink on paper, aluminum, glass, inkjet prints, vinyl

detail, Notes for a Son
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detail, Notes for a Son

detail, Notes for a Son
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Positional / Relational
Derrida writes that in Phadreus “what Plato dreams of is a memory with no sign. That
is, with no supplement. A mnēmē with no hypomnēsis, no pharmakon.”19 Having noted the
problems of such hypomnemata as photography and the archive, it seems important to seek out
authentic and unmediated forms of memory and knowledge. Yet in our contemporary condition
defined by the database this seems increasingly impossible. Pierre Nora argues that condition
of modern memory is “above all, archival. It relies entirely on the materiality of the trace, the
immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image.”20 Sontag echoes this in her discussion
of our increasing need to verify and construct a reality through photography—she writes that
increasingly people “feel that they are images, and are made real by photographs.”21 This impulse
has only been accentuated since the advent of social media. Jeffery Wallen similarly argues that
Modern life is a continual series of contacts with archiving mechanisms — what
is recorded is reflected back to one in myriad ways, and shapes the sense of self
and autobiographical narratives of identity. Autobiography is therefore also in part
constructed out of the archive. Moreover, the archive is a haunting presence for
all autobiography, as it incarnates a potential knowledge that exceeds our own: it
generates the suspicion that someone or something knows us better than we know
ourselves. 22
It seems then, that our contemporary condition is inextricably intertwined with the promblems
of hypomnēsis. So, the questions arises—how do we come to know ourselves or to know anyone
else through this inescapable tension?

19
20
21
22

Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 109
Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 13
Sontag, On Photography, 161
Wallen, “Narrative Tensions,” 270
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In his essay “Play as Self-Realization,” Thomas S. Henricks writes that “comprehending
the self means comprehending one’s relationship or standing before otherness.”23 The self,
Henricks argues, is inherently relational and it is only through the dynamic interplay of the self
with everything beyond it that one comes to know themselves. This dynamic is not limited only
to our relationships, as Henricks writes, “[w]e also experience ourselves amidst the occurrences
we call culture, the environment, our physical bodies, and even the goings-on of our own
mind.”24 We have limited control over any of these spheres of influence, and so self-realization is
the dynamic processes of understanding these very limitations. Henricks writes, “to have a self
is to identify with of these ongoing patterns and process we claim as our own and to turn these
possessions into resources that we can use to manage our lives. That self-quest is identical to the
quest of play.”25 So play, interaction, and dialogue are integral to understanding the boundaries of
our being, and therefore also integral to our capacity to know the other.

Martin Buber referred to this inter-subjective identity as the “I-Thou” encounter. Buber
argues that no “I” exists apart from the relationship to an “other.” Such dialogic relationships
with the other transforms both individuals in a way that is beyond instrumental language. Buber
writes “the primary word I-Thou can be spoken only with the whole being…I become through
my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou.”26 The mutuality of this dynamic is openended and living, it defies simple logic or sense. In this encounter, “no system of ideas, no
foreknowledge, and no fancy intervene between I and Thou. The memory itself is transformed,
as it plunges out of its isolation into the unity of the whole.”27 This is in stark contrast to the I-It
encounter which is unidirectional—it assumes that objects or others are fixed quantities that
can be endlessly measured and manipulated. For Buber, the I-Thou dynamic is not exclusive to
23
Thomas S. Henricks, “Play as Self-Realization: Towards a General Theory of Play,”
American Journal of Play 6, no. 2 (Winter, 2014): 199.
24
Henricks, 203
25
Henricks, 204
26
Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Smith (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1942), 11.
27
Buber, 11
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interpersonal relationships, but is a framework for understanding any encounter between objects,
people, animals, etc. So then, what are the processes by which we navigate this encounter,
what are the tools we employ? Such an encounter requires communication and external signs
of recognition. Language, writing, images, gestures, art, and photography are the processes by
which we interact with each other and the world around us—these are the tools for learning
through mimicry and play. They are clearly flawed and imperfect, yet seemingly essential as
intermediaries in the I-Thou encounter. To forgo such dialogic tools in pursuit of mnēmē with no
hypomnēsis might amount to withdrawal into an I cut off from the Thou.

In Letter to a Friend (2021) I wanted to consider how inter-relational processes influence
my sense of self. The project began when I attempted to contact a childhood friend I had not
spoken to in twenty years. I was able to get his address through social media and wrote him
a letter, but never received a response. Several months later I hired an actor to read the letter,
making notes and annotations as he went. I then asked him to write an imagined biography
of both the letter writer and the recipient. With this information he then wrote a response to
my letter, as fictional stand-in for my friend. The audio recording of this fabricated letter is
played over a video made in Google Earth of the neighborhood in which I lived as a child. The
interpreted and translated letter serves as counterpoint against the glitchy, incomplete 3D model
of a remembered place.
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stills from Letter to a Friend (2021), video, audio, and ink on paper
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Annotated letter from Letter to a Friend

36

Fictive biography from Letter to a Friend
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In her essay “What is a Photograph? What Is Photography?” Ariella Azoulay argues
that we should conceive of a photograph not as a “single sovereign, stable point of view,” but
as “an encounter of several protagonists, mainly photographer and photographed, camera and
spectator.”28 Understood as the record of an encounter, then, a photograph is open to a plurality
of readings and understandings as seen through the diversity of the perspectives of those
involved. Azoulay argues that this encounter is limited not only to the moment in which the
photo is taken but expands out into each new viewing of the photograph, implicating the viewer
in the process of meaning making. The “photography-event” as Azoulay calls it requires that one
must “bear witness” and “use one’s civil imagination to complete the multiple points of view.”29
In such an encounter between viewer and image then the process is not unidirectional—a viewer
simply inscribing a meaning onto an image—but is dynamic, open-ended and ongoing.

In “The Persistence of Vision,” Donna Haraway echoes Azoulay, writing “there is
no unmediated photography or passive camera obscura in scientific accounts of bodies and
machines; there are only highly specific visual possibilities, each with a wonderfully detailed,
active, partial way of organizing worlds.”30 In the essay Haraway argues for a feminist
objectivity that she defines simply as “situated knowledges.”31 Haraway argues against totalizing
visions of the world as they are put forth either in meta-narratives or scientific accounts. Yet she
is equally skeptical of a collapse into the hyper-individualism of relativism. One vision of reality
is located externally in tools for documenting and recording, while the other resides internally
in the idiosyncratic and subjective self. Haraway argues for “politics and epistemologies of
location, positioning, and situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being

28
Ariella Azoulay, “What is a Photograph? What is Photography?” Philosophy of
Photography 1, no. 1, (2010): 10-11.
29
Azoulay, 13
30
Donna Haraway, “The Persistence of Vision,” in The Visual Culture Reader, ed. Nicholas
Mirzoeff (London: Routledge, 1998), 193.
31
Haraway, 191
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heard to make rational knowledge claims.”32 Of photographs she writes, “pictures of the world
should not be allegories of infinite mobility and interchangeability, but of elaborate specificity
and difference and the loving care people might take to learn how to see faithfully from another’s
point of view.”33 Haraway, like Azoulay, envisions photographs not as forms of objective
documentation, but as sites of relational, imaginative encounter.

Taken together, Haraway and Azoulay’s arguments suggest a possibility for engaging
with the problems of hypomnēsis in a way that parallels Buber’s I-Thou encounter. Perhaps we
might reconceptualize archives, documents, photographs, books, news articles etc. not as fixed
data points for our acquisition and manipulation, but as dynamic events or encounters that open
us to a plurality of perspectives and expand our conceptions of self and other. Such a reframing
would require viewers and makers to not act simply as passive receptors or authoritative
archivists, but as active, participatory witnesses.34 Through active witnessing, these positional
modes of communications might then be reopened to narration, testimony, and collective
remembering. What is required then is continual resistance to essentializing forms of knowledge
production not only in our recognitions of the other or in examinations of institutional archives,
but also within the conceptions of our own identities. The self, as much as any politicized
archive, then become potentially productive sites of ambivalence and intersection. This limited
positionality may be uncomfortable because it is open-ended and indeterminant—it cannot be
algorithmically predicted or controlled. Yet it may also reopen the possibility of learning and
relating through experimentation and play. To understand ourselves dialogically and relationally
is to understand ourselves always in this tension between absolute and relative, narrative and
archival, mnēmē and hypomnēsis.

32
Haraway, 197
33
Haraway, 193
34
For a disscussion on passive seeing versus active witnessing see Jane Blocker, Seeing
Witness: Visuality and the Ethics of Testimony (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2009).
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